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THE UNRELIABLE RECORD TITLE

ROBERT L. STROUP II*

I. INTRODUCTION
Problems involving competing interests in real property have
existed almost as long as society has recognized private ownership
of property. Since the adoption of recording systems as the means
of establishing real estate ownership as a matter of public record,
the issues have usually involved competing interests relating to
those records, generally with one of these interests not recorded.
A few states have adopted a strictly "race" system, which provides
that the first party to record is the prevailing party.1 In order to
ameliorate the harshness of this system, the majority of states have
adopted a "race-notice" system. 2 This Article will discuss the
problems of the race-notice system in North Dakota.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Section 47-1941

3
of the North Dakota Century Code,

*B.A,. Universitv of North Dakota, 1965: J.1., U niversiv o1'North Dakota. 1967: minewt r ,f the
North Dakotta Bar: currently a inenber of he law lirnm of Nillcs, Hansen. Magill & )avies. Ltd..
Fargo. N.D.
1.4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.5 at 538 (A. Casner ed. 1952). See Dulin v. Williams, 239
N.C. 33, 79 S.E.2d 213 (1953) (first party to record has priority even if he has notice of prior
unrecorded conveyances). Some states use a pure race concept only for certain types of conveyances,
such asImtortgages or tiineral
leases. See. e..g.. 0110 REV. CoI)E ANN. § 5301.09 (Page 1938) (first ti
record controls priorities of oil and gas leases); PA. STAT. ANN tit. 21, § 621 (Purdon 1955) (first to
record controls priorities of mortgages):
2. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.5 at 542 (A. Casner ed. 1952). Race-notice type statutes
grant priority to the purchaser who records first, provided he is without notice of prior claims. J.
CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 285 (2d ed. 1975).
3. N.D. CENT. CODE S 47-19-41 (1978).
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commonly referred to as the "Recording Act," has been a part of
the statutory law of North Dakota since statehood. The
substantive, operative language of section 47-19-41 provides:
Every conveyance of real estate not recorded shall be
void as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith,
and for a valuable consideration, of the same real estate,
or any part or portion thereof, whose conveyance,
whether in the form of a warranty deed, or deed of
bargain and sale, or deed of quitclaim and release, of the
form in common use or otherwise, first is deposited with
the proper officer for record and subsequently recorded,
whether entitled to record or not, or as against an
attachment levied thereon or any judgment lawfully
obtained, at the suit of any party, against the person in
whose name the title to such land appears of record, prior
4
to the recording of such conveyance.
The language appears, at first blush, to be simple and
straightforward. In essence section 47-19-41 embodies the axiom
"first in time, first in right." Whichever of two transferees of the
same property first records makes the other's conveyance void. If a
transferee contests the other transferee's ownership in the property,
the problem can be resolved by merely ascertaining the
order of recording, when both are recorded; or which transferee has
recorded, if only one has recorded.
Obviously, when courts attempt to apply this rule to real life
situations the solution is not this easy. Issues that have been raised
include: What is a conveyance;

5

what constitutes good faith; 6 what

consideration; 7

is valuable
whether or not an instrument was
recorded; 8 and combinations and variations thereof. The North
Dakota Supreme Court has decided many of these issues, only to be
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Norris, 74 N.W.2d 497 (N.D. 1955) (reservation
of mineral rights is a conveyance within § 47-19-41); Battersby v. Gillespie, 57 N.D. 426, 222
N.W.480 (1928) (assignment of a contract for deed is a conveyance). The term "conveyance" is
defined in § 47-19-42 of the North Dakota Century Code to include "every instrument in writing by
which any estate or interest in real property is created, aliened, mortgaged, or encumbered, or by
which the title to any real property may be affected, except a will or power of attorney." N.D. CENT.
CODE S 47-19-42 (1978).

6. See Harry E. McHugh, Inc. v. Haley, 61 N.D. 359, 237 N.W. 835 (1931) (good faith implies
(he absence ofintortiation of facts rendering the transaction unconscientious).
7. See Mott v. Holbrook, 28 N.D. 251, 148 N.W. 1061 (1914) (an attaching creditor is a
purchaser for valuable consideration).
8. See Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Norris, 74 N.W.2d 497 (N.D. 1955) (record means to
transcribe the instrument deposited with the register of deeds so that it is a permanent record of that
office); Hanson v. Johnson, 42 N.D. 431, 177 N.W. 452 (1918) (instrument is recorded when it is
entered in the reception book or spread at length on the record).
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reversed by legislative amendment. 9 Mineral development has
further complicated the issues because the courts or legislature
must resolve the issues concerning substrata estates as to which
surface estate principles may not apply. 10
Before examining the cases involving the Recording Act, this
Article will discuss the changes effected in section 47-19-41 and
section 47-19-42, which defines conveyance." Both of these
sections have been a part of North Dakota statutory law since
territorial days, at sections 671 and 672 of the Revised Codes of
1877.12 Section 671 established "race-notice" as. the rule for the
territory to apply in analyzing competing claims -concerning the
13
record title to a parcel of real estate.
Since the Recording Act, by its terms, applied only to
conveyances, the definition provided in section 67214 was a
limitation on the scope of the Act. Section 672 excepted wills,
executory contracts for sale, and powers of attorney from its
coverage. 15 By excluding contracts for deed (executory contracts for
the sale or purchase of real property) the drafters of the Revised
16
Codes evidently recognized a contract right as a chose in action,
and ignored the doctrine of equitable conversion created by courts
9. See Messersmith v. Smith, 60 N.W.2d 276 (N.D. 1953). The court in Messersmith held that the
recording of a deed that was not entitled to be recorded for lack of proper acknowledgement did not
constitute notice. Id. at 281-82. The 1959 amendment to 5 47-19-41 provides that the "record of all
instruments whether or not the same were entitled to be recorded shall be deemed valid and sufficient
as the legal record thereof. " Act ofMarch 11, 1959, ch. 334, § 4, 1959 N.D. Sess. Laws 624 (codified
s aucndtd at N.D. CENT. Con- 47-19-41 (1978)).
10. E, t.. iossession ordinarily gives notice of an outstanding tincr'is in ie surlte: however,
there can be no possession of an undeveloped, severed mineral estate.
11. Se N.D. CENTIi COoE § 47-19-42 (1978) (defines conseyanice). A Iubltr of otltr tltde
sections have rehvanc (o Recording Act cases. See N.D. CE.NTi.COD §. 1-01-21 (1975) (delines
good fait). 1-01-22 (dilines nottie): 1-01-23 (defines actual notice): 1-01-24 (delines constructive
n(itic'): 1-(1-25 (stlablisftcs what c(nstitutes construclive notitc).
12. DAKOTA REV. CODE §§ 67"1, 672 (1877).
13. Section 671 of the Dakota Revised Code provided:

o(t

Nti5tcrv((itsevan('t
(if real property, other than a lease fur t terin tt
extceding
\ oid its against tnv subsequent purchases to co(n lnitit
e, inclding an

st(,tir. is

assignee of a mortgage, lease, or other conditional estate, of the same property, or any
part thereof, in good faith and for a valuable consideration, whose conveyance is first
duly recorded.
/d.
14. Section 672 of the Dakota Revised Code provided:
The term "conveyance," as used in the last section, embraces every instrument in
writing by which any estate or interest in real property is created, aliened, mortgaged,
or encumbered, or by which the title to any real property may be affected; except wills,
executory contracts for the sale or purchase of real property, and power of attorney.
Id.
15. Id.
16. A "chose in action" is defined as a "personal right not reduced into possession, but
recoverable by a suit at law. A right to personal things of which the owner has nit the possession, but
merely a right of action for their possession." BLACK's LAW DicTIONARY 219 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
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of equity to protect the interest of contract vendees.' 7 Both of these
sections remained unchanged until 1903, when the legislature
changed the definition of conveyance to delete the executory
8
contract exception. 1
The amplification and clarification effected by the 1903
Recording Act 9 resolved some problems that the former Act did
not address. The new Act recognized the parties' status under
contracts for deed resulting from the doctrine of equitable
conversion, the vendee being the equitable owner and the vendor
being relegated to the status of a lien holder. 20 The new Act also
addressed the status of judgment creditors and attachment creditors
whose interests attached to real estate pursuant to statute. The new
Act gave these statutory interests the same priority as deeds or
mortgages.
The North Dakota Legislature made no substantive changes in
the codification of the 1943 Code. 21 The Recording Act remained
essentially the same as the 1903 version, with only some minor
language changes for clarification. The last substantive change
occurred in 1959, when the legislature codified the Act in its
22
present form.
17. The doctrine of equitable conversion looks upon the vendee as the owner of the land at the
time of a valid contract of sale. The vendor holds the legal estate as security for the purchase price
prior to the actual conveyance. 2J. POMEROY, EQUiTYJURISPRUDENCE 21 (5th ed. 1941).
18. Act of March 13, 1903, ch. 152, § 2, 1903 N.D. Sess. Laws 203.
19. Act of March 13, 1903, ch. 152, 1903 N.D. Sess. Laws 202-03. The legislature also revised
the Recording Act to provide, in its operative parts:
Every conveyance by deed, mortgage or otherwis , of real istat" within this stat.
shallbe recorded in the office of the register of deeds of' t c ounitv shcre suc real
idia against
cstai" is situated, and every such convevanc rot so recorded shall be
any subsequent purchaser in good aith, and fora Valuable i onsideiration, 01' Ihesamte

real estate, iir any part or portion thereof, whose ('on.;evan(c, whether in the lio if a
the orn
warranty Iced, or deed of bargain and sale, deed of qu'tclaiti and ielease, ocf
in ctoi...on use, iir otherwise, is first duly rcordect or as against tiy iiai cinctln
the
any
party,
against
at the suit of
thereon, or any judgment lawfully iotbtained,
jvied
person in whose name the title to such land appears of record, prior to the recording of
suchi conveyances .... The fact that such first rtorded colveyane (if 'suchsuliscquent
of a deed ot
purchaser for a valuable consideration is in the Irii, or contains the terms
t
quitclaim and release afbrsaid, shall not affect the question of good faih of the subsequent purchaser, or be of itself notice to hicufany unre orded (ot\ vcances of the
saute real estate or any part thereof.
Act ofMarch 13, 1903, ch.152, § 1, 1903 N.D. Sess. Laws 202-03.
20. SeeClappv. Tower, 11 N.D. 556, 93 N.W. 862 (1903).
21. N.D. REV. CODE § 47-1941 (1943).
22. Act of March 11, 1959, ch. 334, § 1, 1959 N.D. Sess. Laws 624. The Act is codified at §4719-41 of the North Dakota Century Code and provides:
E.very

conveyance of

real estate riot re(irded shall tc

cciI

its against

any

suiisequCnI purchaser in good faith, and loit a s aluable ctisideraticn, oftlhe salce real
a
estate, or-any part or portion thereof, whose COinvevani'ce,s heiher in) he li61ii ofl
warranty deed, or deed of bargain and sale, or deed of quitclaitn and release, of lie
unit in common use or otherwise, first is deposited with proper illicc ir rcord and
subsequently recorded, whether entitled to record or not, or as against an attachment
levied thereon or any judgment lawfully obtained, at the suit of any party, against the
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III. JUDICIAL APPLICATION
A.

"VOID"

INSTRUMENTS

The Recording Act has continuously provided that an
unrecorded conveyance, within the Act's provisions, is void. A
void instrument is a nullity for all purposes. 23 Obviously, the effect
of the Recording Act is not to void every instrument within its
24
proscription. This result would directly conflict with the statutory
5
and judicial
maxims that recognize that an unrecorded
instrument is valid between the parties and against all others who
have knowledge of the instrument's existence. When the North
Dakota Supreme Court has held that the Recording Act applies to
an unrecorded instrument, it has determined that the instrument
loses its priority or is subordinated, but not that the instrument is
26
absolutely void.
Cases in which the court has held an instrument void, with the
consequences that the instrument was a nullity for all purposes,
have involved fraud or forgery, 2 7 not because a subsequent
purchaser did not have notice of the instrument. In cases in which
the court has applied the Recording Act to defeat some interest, the
court has found that the subsequent purchaser had a superior right
28
and that the defeated interest was only being subordinated.
person in whose name the title to such land appears of record, prior to thie recording of
such conveyance. The fact that such first deposited and recorded conveyance of such
subsequent purchaser for a valuable consideration is in the form, or contains the
terms, of a deed of quitclaim and release aforesaid, shall not affect the question of good
faith of the subsequent purchaser, or be of itself notice to him of any unrecorded
conveyance of the same real estate or any part thereof. This section shall be legal
notice to all who claim under unrecorded instruments that prior recording of later
instruments not entitled to be recorded may nullify their right, title, interest or lien, to,
in or upon affected real property. No action affecting any right, title, interest or lien,
to, in or upon real property shall be commenced or maintained or defense or
counterclaim asserted or recognized in court on the ground that a recorded instrument
was not entitled to be recorded. The record of all instruments whether or not the same
were entitled to be recorded shall be deemed valid and sufficient as the legal record
thereof.
N. D. CENT. CODE S 47-19-41 (1978).
23. Dixon v. Kaufman, 58 N.W. 2d 797, 806 (N.D. 1953).
24. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 47-19-46 (1978). Section 47-19-46 provides that unrecorded
instruments are valid between the parties to the instrument. Id.
25. See Magnuson v. Breher, 69 N.D. 197, 284 N.W. 853 (1939) (recordation has no effect on
rights of parties to mortgage or those with notice thereof); Doran v. Dazey, 5 N.D. 167, 64 N.W.
1023 (1895) (party with notice ol unrecorded deed cannot be bona fide purchaser under Recording
Act).
26. See Hunter v. McDevitt, 12 N.D. 505, 97 N.W. 869 (1903) (purchaser with notice of prior
unrecorded contract of sale takes subject to unrecorded contract).
27. A deed procured by fraud is void and may be cancelled. See Bailes v. Advance-Rumley
Thresher Co., 263 F. 676 (8th Cir. 1920) (right to rescission of a deed is governed by the North
Dakota Code). See N. D. CENT. CODE 9-09-02 (1) (rescission permitted when consent obtained by
fraud).
28. SeeCollins v. Federal Lank Bank, 119 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1941) (effect of'Recording Act is to
give piiority to subsequent purchasers over unrecorded holders).
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There have been cases involving the Recording Act in which
the court has found that an instrument was invalid. These findings,
however, were based on grounds other than the Recording Act.
First National Bank v. Casselton Realty & Investment Co. 29 involved a
foreclosure action in which an attaching creditor challenged the
validity of the mortgage.3 0 The court found that the corporate
mortgagor had not validly executed the mortgage and, therefore,
the mortgage was not entitled to be recorded.3 ' Casselton Realty
involved the Recording Act because the court held that the
mortgage was not of record and, therefore, afforded no notice as a
recorded instrument. Consequently, the mortgage did not impart
any notice to subsequent purchasers and the creditor, therefore,
32
had a valid prior lien.
Crosson v. Kartowitz3 3 also involved a dispute between a
mortgagee and an attachment creditor. When Wilhelmina
Kartowitz died she was the record owner of the property. Two of
her heirs, whose interests did not appear in the register of deeds'
office, mortgaged the property. The mortgage contained the wrong
legal description of the property and one of her heirs executed a
second mortgage to 'correct the erroneous legal description. Prior
to the execution of the second mortgage, the defendant brought an
action against one of the heirs and attached the property. The
mortgagee sued to reform the mortgage and establish its mortgage
34
as a prior and superior lien.

Analyzing the competing claims, the court concluded that the
Recording Act did not apply because neither of the interests
concerning the property in dispute were validly of record.3 5 Since
the mortgage described the wrong property, it afforded no notice to
29.44 N.D.353, 175 N.W. 720(1919).
30. First Nat'l Bank v. Casselton Realty and Inv. Co., 44 N.D. 353, 359, 175 N.W. 720, 722
(1919). In Casselton Reaty a mortgagee sought to foreclose a mortgage on realty in which the
defendant claimed an interest. Id. at 357, 175 N.W. at 720. The defendant had obtained ajudgment
against the mortgagor, which was duly docketed. The defendant claimed that the judgment became a
valid prior lien against the property. Id.
31. Id. at 61, 175 N.W. at 722. The court held that the mortgage was not validly executed
because there was no evidence that the board of directors authorized the treasurer to execute the
mortgages. Id.
32. Id. at 362, 175 N.W. at 722. The court held that the judgment lien of the defendant was
superior to the mortgage lien. Id.
33.43 N.D. 466, 175 N.W. 868 (1919).
34. Crosson v. Kartowitz, 43 N.D. 466, 470, 175 N.W. 868, 869 (1919). In Crosson the record
owner died intestate leaving three heirs. Two of the heirs executed a mortgage on the decedent's
property shortly after her death. One of the heirs, whose interest was attached, executed a second
mortgage to correct the erroneous legal description in the first mortgage. At no time during the
pendency of Crosson did the heirs' interest appear in the records of the register of deeds' office. Id. at
470, 175 N.W. at 869.
35. Id. at 473, 175 N.W. at 870-71. In Crosson the defendant was not the record owner of the
realty at the time the defendant executed the mortgage or the creditor attached. Therefore, the court
reasned. the parties did uit bring themtselves within the recirdin .m
statme. d.
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subsequent purchasers. The attachment was also invalid because it
was against a party who was not the record owner.3 6 The attaching
creditor was required to go outside the record to the probate court
files to ascertain that the judgment debtor had an interest in the
property and, therefore, was not relying on the record.3 7

B.

INSTRUMENTS OF RECORD

The courts have also faced a number of cases involving
recording issues in which the Recording Act entered into the
decision. The nature of the issues have been varied; some arise
because of the recording system and others because of recording
errors. When a transferee presents an instrument to the register of
deeds, he must pay the recording fees3 8 and, when required, the
39
auditor must certify that no delinquent taxes are outstanding.
The instrument is stamped with a document number and entered
in the reception book. 40 Thereafter, the instrument is indexed in a
track index and in a grantor-grantee index."1 Once the indexing is
complete, the instrument gives constructive notice relating back to
the time it was received by the register of deeds. 42 From the time of
delivery to the register of deeds until the indexing is completed, the
instrument itself gives constructive notice of its provisions;
thereafter, notice is based upon the instrument as it appears in the
43
register of deeds' records.
Hanson v. Johnson44 is an early case in which the parties raised
the question of whether or not a document was of record. The
defendant had taken a deed as security, which was dated in 1910,
and presented it to the register of deeds in April 1912.45 The taxes
were certified as of that date but since the defendant had not paid
the requisite fees, the deed was not recorded. On May 19, 1914, the
36. Id. at 478, 175 N.W. at 873. The court held that the attachment lien bound only the actual
interest of the debtor at the time of attachment, which was the residue remaining alter th e xecution
of the prior mortgage. Id.
37. Id. at 474, 175 N.W. at 871. The court stated that one seeking the protection of the record
must rely on it. Id.
38. N.rD. CENt. Coin. § It -18-05 (1976 & Supp. 1983).
39. Id § 11-18-02 (1976 & Supp. 1983).

40. Id. §§ 11- 18-09, -10 (1976).
41. Id. $ 1- 18-08 (1976 & Supp. 1983).

42. Id. §47-19-45(1978).
43. It is not safe to rely on the abstract of title either. It is the records in the register of deeds'
office that impart the notice. The consequences of any omission from the abstract are borne by the
party relying on the abstract rather than on the official records. Bilby v. Wire, 77 N.W.2d 882, 88788 (N.D. 1956).
44.42 N.D. 431, 177 N.W. 452 (1918).
45. Hanson v. Johnson, 42 N.D. 431, 434, 177 N.W. 452, 452-53 (1918). In Hanson the court
trc
awidl the 191( deed as a itmrtgage beca ust itwas taken as scurity lot in inltlc ln i hbl.
l d. a(
434. 177 N.W. at 453.

210

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

60:203

defendant paid the fees and the deed was recorded. The plaintiff,
however, received a mortgage dated November 26, 1912, and
recorded the mortgage December 10, 1912.46 The court held that

the defendant's lien was subordinate to the plaintiff's because without payment of the fees and entry in the reception book or being
spread on the record, the document was not of record and,
therefore, did not constitute notice to subsequent purchasers under
the Recording Act. 47 Had the lien been entered in the reception
book or spread on the record, however, it would have constituted
48
constructive notice.
Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Norris49 involved the question of
what notice is afforded by an instrument incorrectly noted on the
records of the register of deeds. The original instrument in Norris
contained a reservation of all minerals to the plaintiff's predecessor.
In the course of transcribing the instrument into the register of
deeds' records, however, the reservation was changed and, in the
records, recited only a reservation of coal and iron.5 0 The court
held that under the Recording Act the recipient of the beneficial
interest had as much of an obligation to ensure the proper
recording of the conveyance as to record the conveyance in the first
instance. 5' Failure to ensure proper recording imposed the same
sanctions as failure to record and, therefore, the court held, that the
recipient was bound by the title as it appeared of record against
third parties who subsequently purchased in reliance on the
record. 5 2 Consequently, the court limited the plaintiff to the
ownership of coal and iron and the subsequent purchasers received
53
the remaining minerals.
Northern Pacific Railway v. Advance Realty Co. 54 involved the
46. Id. at 435-36, 177 N.W. at 453. The court found that the November 26, 1912 mortgage was
based on valuable consideration because the note and mortgage, although given for an antecedent
debt, were demand instruments. Id. at 437-38, 177 N.W. at 454.
47. Id. at 437, 177 N.W. at 454. The court held that the May 1910 mortgage was not of record
until the defendant paid the fees and the register of deeds recorded the instrument in 1914. Id. Thus,
the plaintiff's mortgage, which the plaintiff recorded in 1912 without notice of the prior mortgage,
had priority. Id. at 440-41, 177 N.W. at 455.
48. Id. at 437, 177 N.W. at 454.
49. 74 N.W.2d 497 (N.D. 1955).
50. Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Norris, 74 N.W.2d 497, 501 (N.D. 1955). In Norris the
original grantor issued a warranty deed in 1913 that was recorded reciting a reservation of coal and
iron ore. In 1943 the original grantor issued a quitclaim deed to the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed
that the original reservation in the 1913 deed excepted all minerals and was erroneously recorded. Id.
5 1. Id. at 508. The court held that because the reservation acted as a conveyance to the grantor,
the grantor had a duty to protect its interest against any subsequent good faith purchaser. Id. See N.
D. CENT. CODE 5 47-19-42 (1978) ("conveyance" includes any instrument by which an estate is
created).
52. 74 N.W.2d at 508. The court held that insofar as the reservation was a conveyance of all
mineral rights, it was not recorded and did not constitute notice to subsequent purchasers. Id.
53. Id. at 508-09.
54. 78 N.W.2d 705 (N.D. 1956).
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same problem as Norris. 55 Instead of the title going initially to an
individual, however, as it did in Norris, the plaintiff conveyed the
land to a corporate defendant that was aware of the full mineral
reservation in the original instrument.5 6 The deeds from the
corporate defendant to its grantees contained various provisions
that referred to the original instrument. The court held that the
language "subject to the usual Northwestern Improvement
Company's oil and gas reservation," and "subject to the usual
Northwestern Improvement Company mineral, oil and gas
reservation,''" was sufficient to put the grantee on notice and
concluded that the plaintiff held title to the minerals. 8
Hanson v. Zoller5 9 involved a mortgage from the defendants to
the plaintiffs affecting a number of parcels of land. The plaintiffs
duly recorded the mortgage, but the register of deeds improperly
indexed it in the tract index as to one parcel. The index, therefore,
did not show the mortgage against one parcel. The register of deeds
subsequently corrected the record; however, the defendants
conveyed a number of smaller parcels out of the omitted parcel.
The grantees of these parcels had no knowledge of the plaintiff's
mortgage. 60 The court acknowledged that the purpose of the
Recording Act was to protect purchasers of real property. 6' The
55. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Advance Realty Co., 78 N.W.2d 705, 712 (N.D. 1956). See Norris, 74
N.W.2d at 501. Thc crporation in Advante Realv attenipted to convey mineral rights. 78 N.W.2d ;it
711.
56. 78 N.W.2d at 711, 714. The corporate defendant, Advance Realty, had actual notice of the
full mineral reservation and took title subject to the reservation. Id. at 714.
57. Id.at 715.
58. Id. at 717. The court held that the reservation language in the deeds from Advance Realty
Comtpany "was stllfi'iuit to pl snbsetltU(Il pitichastrs (in notic and notlhaving iadt inquiry liey
at It 'ind
iI they." Id,
[Ittlh st instliti's int which tih drcids tolitain
d iio rtes'rvaion,.
t ,i gtLanct was held to own the
minerals, except for coal and iron. In one instance, Advance Realty gave a deed with no reservation
but a subsequent deed to the same grantee provided "excepting and reserving unto Northwestern
Ilpiivlttnt
(iomipay,.
its SntVSSliS Or ssiglS. ill tininclals 0
ill tv iattturc s'lttasocVr. intlulding
coil. iron, tatural gas ;inld
Oilupon or in saido
l n.l
Id.at 715. W hile holding that til lirst
dccd
Would hivt convevtl tht mintrals to(it-glaittne. dw (tiut found
I d. bv inserting Ihts restrvattotn i
(Iit n o lift. thait
,r
s
a
'
l
U
is
h
t
u
.
p
c
o
l
a
r
g
e
h
t
.
uti
a
ti v v
nl i(
s equ nt
a St lb
59. 187 N.W.2d47 (N.D.1971).
60. Hanson v. Zoller, 187 N.W.2d 47, 50 (N.D. 1971). In Hanson v.Zoller the mortgagors
subdivided land covered by the mortgage. Because the register of deeds improperly indexed the
mortgage in the tract index, the abstracts oftitle did not disclose the existence of the prior mortgage.
The mortgagor foreclosed and made the subsequent purchasers and lienholders defendants to the
action. Id.at 50.
61. Id. at 54. The court, in commenting on the purpose of the Recording Act, noted:
The fundamental purpose of the recording statutes is to protect potential purchasers of
real property against the risk that they may be paying out good money to someone who
does not actually own the property that he is purporting to sell. The recording acts
operate by making the history of the title involved in a real estate transaction readily
available toa prospective purchaser, and by providing that the history so disclosed by
the record is binding upon a prospective lurchaser whether he consults the record or
not.
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court also noted that an instrument must actually be recorded to
give constructive notice to the public. Depositing an instrument
with. the register of deeds gives only temporary constructive notice
until completion of the recording. 62 The court in Hanson held that
only instruments in the tract index afforded the purchaser with
notice. The purchaser was not charged with notice of what either
63
the reception books or the grantor-grantee index contained.
C.

CHAIN OF TITLE

Another interesting concept regarding the Recording Act is
the "chain of title." In Doran v. Daze 64 the court recognized as
being well settled that a recorded instrument outside the chain of
title does not give constructive notice of its existence. 65 The court
went on to hold that the defendant knew of the existence of the
instrument and, therefore, was charged with notice. 66 The novelty
of this position is illustrated by the court's observation in Hanson v.
Zoller that "[t]he existence of a tract index, which not only makes
all instruments equally accessible to reasonable search, but which
has its primary focus upon tracts of land rather than upon grantors
and grantees, makes the concept of 'chain of title' as developed in
62. Id. at 55. The court cited Norris in holding that § 47-19-08 (record constitutes notice to all
persons) and 5 47-19-45 (depositing ofinstrument with proper officer constitutes cnsirot its nt ircc)
must be construed together. Id See N. D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-19-08, -45 (1978). Concerning the effect
of recording and the applic ation iftthe statutes relating thereto, the C'ourt quoted Aiorri in slating:
Their proper construction is that an instrument gives only temporary constructive
notice of its contents when deposited in the office of the register of deeds and that when
the instrument is recorded the record for purposes of constructive notice relates back to
the date of deposit and as of that time is constructive notice of the contents actually and
correctly recorded.
187 N.W.2d at 55 (quoting Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Norris, 74 N.W.2d 497, 506 (N.D.
1955)).
63. Hanson v.Zoller, 187 N.W.2d at 56. The court stated:
The holding in effect is the beneficiary of any interest in any real estate conveyance has
a duty to protect his interest against subsequent purchases by making certain that the
instrument conveying his interest is properly recorded, because he is the only persoin
that by exercising some diligence can discover errors in the recording which a
subsequent purchaser even by the exercise of the greatest diligence could not possibly
do.
Id. at 57-58.
64. 5 N.D. 167, 64 N.W. 1023 (1895).
65. Doran v. Dazey, 5 N.D. 167, 169, 64 N.W. 1023, 1024(1895). InDoran the original owners
executed a valid deed to Sims in 1883 but Sims did not record the deed until 1887. In 1884 the
defendant purchased the land from the record owner. The defendant knew of the outstanding
conveyance in 1883 and Sims' mortgage of the land but, because the 1883 conveyance was not then
of record, the defendant did not believe that it would affect his status as a bona fidepurchaser. Id.
66. Id. at 171, 64 N.W. at 1025. The legislature amended present § 47-19-46 in 1899 to change
the Doran result by adding "but knowledge of the record ofan instrument out of the chain of title does
not constitute such notice." Act of February 24, 1899, ch. 167, § 1, 1899 N.D. Sess. Laws 239
(codified as amended at N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19-46 (1978)).
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relation to the old grantor and grantee type index inapplicable. "67
Since the recording system in North Dakota has remained the same
"chain of title" concept should never
since territorial days, the
68
relevance.
any
had
have
The chain of title concept is different from the situation in
which an instrument not entitled to record is recorded. In Roby v.
Bismarck National Bank69 the court recognized that a duly executed
and recorded instrument that is absolutely void does not give
constructive notice and neither actual nor constructive notice could
aid the void instrument. 70 The court applied this proposition to
reduce the priority of a mortgage in First National Bank v. Casselton
Realty & Investment Co. 7 In Casselton Realty the court held that since
a corporation had not validly executed a mortgage, it was not
entitled to be recorded and, therefore, did not give notice to
subsequent purchasers. 7 2 Presently, the statutes provide that any
instrument of record gives notice of its contents, regardless of
73
whether or not it is entitled to be recorded.
D.

PURCHASER

Another question concerns whether or not a purchaser comes
within the Recording Act. The purchaser must first be a
subsequent purchaser before the Act will charge him with notice of
a recorded instrument.7 4 One whose interest antedates the
conveyance is not charged with notice of a transaction that took
place subsequently. The parties must also be purchasers from the
same party. 75 Thus, in Baird v. Stubbins76 the holder of unrecorded
tax deeds did not lose title to the holder of a sheriff's deed because
67. Hanson v. Zoller, 187 N.W.2d 47, 55 (N.D. 1971).
68. See supra notes 3-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of he legislative history of the
l, t)rding Act.
69. 4 N.D. 56, 59 N.W. 719(1894).
70. Roby v. Bismarck Nat'l Bank, 4 N.D. 156, 162, 59 N.W. 719, 721 (1894). Roby involved a
lnort age that the nimortgage had taken on homestead property. The plaintiff (ontended that
because the mortgage was not properly executed, the instrument was void and could not constitute
notice to subsequent purchasers. Id. at 160, 59 N.W. at 720. The court found that the mortgage was
partially valid to the extent of the vendor's purchase money. Id. Because the mortgage was not
absolutely void, the plaintiffs had notice of the encumbrance and had a duty to inquire further. Id. at
162, 59 N.W. at 721.
71. 44 N.I). 353. 175 N.W. 720 (1919). See supra notes 29-32 and ac(onipanying text for a
discussion of Casselton Realty.
72. First Nat'l Bank v. Casselton Realty and Inv. Co., 44 N.D. 353, 359, 175 N.W. 720, 722
(1919). The mortgage in Casselton Realty was not validly executed because the executing
representative of the corporate mortgagor was not authorized to do so. Id.
73. See N. D. CENT. CODE § 47-19-41 (1978).
74. First Nat'l Bank v. Big Bend Land Co., 38 N.D. 33, 164 N.W. 322 (1917) (record notice is
notice only to subsequent purchasers).
75. McCoy v. Davis, 38 N.D. 328, 337, 164 N.W. 951, 954 (1917) (record gives notice only to
persons in same line of title - those who must trace their title back to the same grantor).
76.58 N.D. 351, 226 N.W. 529(1929).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

60:203

tax deeds are not conveyances under the Recording Act. 7 7 The
court in Baird held that title conveyed by tax deeds created a new
title and did not convey the interest of the person who lost the title
for taxes.

78

Even the form of the instrument has been the basis for
determining the question of a purchaser's good faith. In Gress v.
Evans79 the Supreme Court of Dakota concluded that a conveyance
by quitclaim deed, purporting to convey only "the right, title,
interest, claim or demand" of the grantor, was sufficient to put the
purchaser on notice. 80 The apparent conclusion in Gress was that a
conveyance by quitclaim deed signalled the existence of a superior
claim that the grantee should have discovered. 8' This result was
82
changed by the 1903 amendment to the Recording Act.

E. GOOD

FAITH

The most frequent issue involving the Recording Act is
whether or not the party seeking to invoke the Act is a good faith
purchaser. Because of the highly subjective nature of this question,
good faith defies absolute definition, although the court has enunciated many black letter principles. While these principles establish
some broad parameters, they often merely beg the question rather
than definitively resolve it. One principle the courts recite consistently in Recording Act cases is that the purchaser must not have
knowledge of the unrecorded instrument. When the purchaser has
actual knowledge, the question is readily resolved. Much has been
written, and many statutory amendments adopted, in an effort to
resolve the question of good faith when the facts require the determination of whether or not the purchaser will be charged with constructive notice.
77. Baird v. Stubbins, 58 N.D. 351, 226 N.W. 529, 532 (1929). In Baird the sheriff issued the
plaintiff a sheriff's deed. The defendant had earlier acquired the same land through a tax sale, but
had not recorded the tax deed. Id. at 353, 226 N.W. at 530. The court held that the defendant's
filure to record the tax deed did not render the tax deed void. Id. at 354, 226 N.W. at 531.
78. Id. at 356-57, 226 N.W. at 532. The court noted that a tax title in no way connects itself with
the previous chain of title. Id.
79. 1 Dakota 371, 46 N.W. 1132 (1877).
80. Gress v. Evans, I Dakota 371,384, 46 N.W. 1132, 1134 (1877).
81. Id. The court in Gress noted that a quitclaim deed simply purported to pass whatever interest
the grantee had. The court affirmed the trial judge's ruling that "such a grantee cannot be regarded
as a boia fide purchaser without notice." Id.
8"2. Scc unpw imi 19 fi~r dic reh'vani itcxl of the 1903' ainen nImcni I(, diht Reemrding A((.
Because a conveyance is defined to include every instrument that might affect an interest in real
estate, the conclusion that a quitclaim deed signals the existence of a superior claim seems untenable.
The legislature obviated the question by adding, "whether in the form of a warranty deed, or deed of
bargain and sale, deed of quitclaim and release, of the form in common use, or otherwise." Act of
.Marh 13.
( 1978)).

1903.

h.

152.

§ 1. N.I). Svss.

laws 203 (codiifitd at

N.I). C x'.

Ctoiii

47-1tl-41
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Early in territorial judicial history, the courts established the
maxims applicable to the notice question. In Gress v. Evans 3 the
Supreme Court of Dakota stated that "[a]ctual notice of a prior
unrecorded conveyance, or of any title, legal or equitable, to the
premises, or knowledge and notice of any facts which should put a
prudent man upon inquiry, impeaches the good faith of the subsequent purchaser. "84 The court has quoted and paraphrased this
language in Recording Act cases for over 100 years since Gress, with
little more definitive explanation of the principles than it originally
enunciated. Certainly, the courts established circumstances that
required further inquiry or that of themselves imparted notice sufficient to impugn good faith. Interestingly, even though particular
circumstances have become definitely established as those that impart notice, circumstantial questions still arise even in these
situations.
The most notable circumstance that the courts have
established as imparting the requisite notice is possession. In Red
River Valley Land & Investment Co. v. Smith85 the court recognized the
rule that possession of the premises gives the intended purchaser
notice of the possessor's rights and recognized and applied a major
exception to this rule: that when the possession is consistent with
the record title, the possession is presumed to be under that title,
and the possession is not notice of any outstanding unrecorded
equities. 86 In Red River Valley Land a lessee under a lease of record
claimed that he made an oral agreement with the lessor to purchase
the leased premises. 8 7 The court held that the lessee's possession
was consistent with the recorded lease and did not require the pur83. 1 Dakota 371,46 N.W. 1132 (1877).
84. Gress v. Evans, 1 Dakota 371, 383, 46 N.W. 1132, 1134 (1877). The court, in determining
whether a grantee had acted in good faith, stated:
Proof of circumstances, short of actual notice, which should put a prudent ttan upon
inquiry, authorizes the court, orjury, to infer and find actual notice.
Or tt, express it exactly, good faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from
taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through the forms or
technicalities of law, together with an absence of all information or belief of facts which
would render the transaction unconscientious. And notice is either actual or
constructive. Actual notice consists in express information of a fact. Constructive
notice is notice imputed by the law to a person not having actual notice: and everv
person who has actual notice of circumtstances sufftcient to put a prudent man upon
inquiry as to a particular fact, and who otsits to make such inquiry with reasonable
diligence is deemed to have constructive notice of the fact itself'.
Id.
85. 7 N.D. 236, 74 N.W. 194 (1898).
86. Red River Valley Land & Inv. Co. v. Smith, 7 N.D. 236. 240-41. 74 N.W. 194, 195 (1898).
87. Id. at 237-38, 74"N.W. at 194. In Smith the lessee claimed that lse was the equitable owner of
the leased premises and that the lease agreement was part of a securitv arrangement with the lessor.
Id. at 238-39, 74 N.W. at 195.
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chaser to inquire concerning any other unrecorded claim that the
88
lessee asserted.
In Ilvedsen v. First State Bank8 9 a husband and wife owned their
residence as tenants in common. Upon their divorce, the husband
quitclaimed his interest to his wife, who remained in possession but
who could not record the deed because of unpaid taxes. 90 The bank
subsequently secured a judgment against the husband and levied
on the property. 9' Even though the bank's attorney had drawn the
divorce complaint and could not find the husband to serve him with
the levy, 9 2 the court held that the "[p]laintiff's possession at all
times has been perfectly consistent with the record title which
disclosed such tenancy in common, and she is therefore presumed
to have held such possession in subordination to the right of her cotenant as thus disclosed by the public records. "91
By 1916, the proposition that possession was sufficient to impart notice to the world of the equities of the person in possession
' ' 94
had become "too well settled to require extended discussion.
Possession afforded complete protection as notice of the possessor's
95
right against all persons thereafter acquiring liens upon the land
and constructive notice by possession had the same force and effect
96
as actual notice.

In Agricultural Credit Corp. v. State97 the court extended the concept of notice by possession to notice by the possession of a third
party. In Agricultural Credit the tenant of the grantor remained in
possession after the transfer to the plaintiff. 98 The plaintiff did not
record the deed because of unpaid taxes. 99 The tenant had
knowledge of the transfer and delivered the landlord's crop share to
88. Id. at 241, 74 N.W. at 196. The lessor conveyed the land to a third party who subsequently
conveyed it to the plaintiff. The court held that even if the third party had notice of the lessee's
equitable interest, the plaintiffwas a good faith purchaser and took title free from tlse lessee's claims.
Id. at 243-45, 74 N.W. at 195.
89. 24 N.D. 227, 139 N.W. 105 (1912).
90. llvedsen v. First State Bank, 24 N.D. 227, 230-32, 139 N.W. 105, 106-07 (1912). In Ilvedsen
tile register of deeds refused to record the wife's deed because there were unpaid taxes against the
property. Id. at 232, 139 N.W. at 107.
91. Id. at 231, 139 N.W. at 107. The bank had no actual knowledge ofthe unrecorded deed. Id.
92. Id. at 235, 139 N.W. at 108. The court stated that knowledge of the husband's absence from
the premises, even if it could be imputed to the bank, was insufficient to impart constructive notice
dsat fie had conveyed his interest. Id.
93. Id.
94. Quaschneck v. Blodgett, 32 N.D. 603,611, 156 N.W. 216,218 (1916).
95. Id. at 613, 156 N.W. at 219.
96. Id.
97. 74 N.D. 71, 20 N. W.2d 78 (1945).
98. Agri iuh ralCT
l (I l (:r
p . State. 74 N. ). 71, 74. 20 N.W .2s 78, 79 (1945). In Agricultural
l
Credit the grantor had mortgaged property to the plaintiff. As a satisfaction of the indebtedness, the
mortgagee transferred the secured property and affected leases to the plaintiff. Id.
99. Id.
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the plaintiff. The State attempted to levy on a judgment it had
secured against the plaintiff's grantor. 0 0 Judgments are protected
under the Recording Act and have priority when docketed against
the legal title owner.' 0 ' The court in Agricultural Credit, however, did
not accord the State's judgment such lofty status. The court held
that the tenant's possession was sufficient to give the State notice of
the plaintiff's unrecorded interest stating:
So far as this land is concerned, the entering and
docketing of the judgment was a 'shot in the dark' by the
defendant. And the defendant could not have been misled
by reason of the fact that there was a change of ownership
... .It is clear to us, under the circumstances disclosed,
the plaintiff may rely upon the rule of notice by reason of
occupancy and it is thus immaterial that its deed was not
of record at the time the judgment was docketed or later
when the levy was made and the property was sold at
02
execution sale. 1
On the basis of the Agricultural Credit decision, one must
seriously question whether or not the "consistent with the record
title" position enunciated in Red River Valley Land and Ilvedsen has
any continuing viability. The extension of the rule to possession by
a third party certainly makes tenuous any reliance on the assumption that tenancy consistent with the record title gives no notice of
any unrecorded claim of ownership. Most title examiners generally
provide in their title opinion that the intended purchaser is charged
with notice of the rights of the person in possession. 03 Perhaps this
should also be expanded to include any rights of any third person
whose interest might be disclosed by inquiring of the person in
possession.
Many potential problems can arise under this philosophy.
This is not an onerous burden to place on the intended purchaser
when the occupant is one individual; however, what is the extent of
the inquiry required in multi-tenant properties? Theoretically, the
purchaser cannot rely on the inquiry of some of the tenants which
establishes that they occupy under monthly tenancies to defeat the
,
100. Id. The ,slaw had o)tlainc'(
a iudIgmt-1n1 for unpaid
kmi 'n's
m)'s*
i p miu~lm
against the grantor after the transfer to the plaintiff. The State claimed title through the cxc (:utin
sale on the judgment. Id.
101.
CE-r. (h )tw § 47-19-41 (1978). Seeahw Bamt rs v v. (;ilhlpic.. 57 N.I). 426, 222
(N.).
N.W. 480 (1928).
102. 74 N.D. at 79, 20 N.W.2d at 81.
103.4 AMERtCAN LAW OF PROPERTY 853 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
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claim of a tenant under a written lease for a term of years. Can a
purchaser assume that a lessee for a limited purpose, for example a
mineral lessee or a tenant in a shopping center, need not be queried
regarding information of any other interest? Certainly, a purchaser
cannot rely on self-serving negation by the seller concerning any
unrecorded interest regardless of whether or not the representation
was made honestly in a belief that none existed or had been forgotten. 104
Actions in which the Recording Act is involved are generally
equitable in nature, bringing into play a number of equitable
maxims. In Henniges v. Johnson'0 5 the court recognized that the
Recording Act was predicated on the general principle that when
one of two innocent parties must suffer from the wrongful acts of a
third person, the person who must suffer is the person who allowed
the third person to do the wrong. 106 The court also recognized that
Recording Acts, which have for their purpose the better security
and repose of titles, may postpone the claim of one who voluntarily
neglects to avail himself of their protection to the claims of sub107
sequent purchasers who acted on the faith of the public records.
The North Dakota Supreme Court appeared to establish a
definite policy in Rolette County Bank v. Hanlyn, 108 which involved a
common scenario in Recording Act cases. The plaintiff, who did
not record its instrument, claimed the defendant should have
known of the unrecorded instrument. The defendant claimed
reliance on the record. 109 The court held that the defendant was not
required to inquire of the plaintiff's interest stating:
Our examination of the cases dealing with the question of
priority in the general circumstances stated leads us to the
104. See Manig v. Bachman, 127 Cal.2d 216, 273 P.2d 596 (1954) (when a stranger to the title is
,rssessin,. ichaser is required to make inquiry i fthe part' in ir.ssssior): Hcllh an v. lx\ v.
' 55
Cal. 117 (1880) (when a stranger to the title is in possession, purchaser must use utmost diligence to
become informed of the possessor's rights).
105. 9 N.D. 489, 84 N.W. 350 (1900).
106. Henniges v. Johnson, 9 N.D. 489, 497, 84 N.W. 350, 353 (1900). In Henniges v. Johnson the
defendant purchased property encumbered by an unrecorded mortgage. The defendant was unaware
of the mortgage. The plaintiffs purchased the notes secured by the mortgage. Id. at 493-94, 84 N.W.
at 351. The court noted that the plaintiffs could have prevented the fraudulent sale by recording their
interests. Id. at 497, 84 N.W. at 353.
107. /d. at 497, 84 N.W. at 353. The court notd that hdwiurliscId rcumulin. acts is to lioid
better security and repose of titles. Id.
108.48 N.D. 72, 183 N.W. 260(1921).
109. Rolette County Bank v. Hanlyn, 48 N.D. 72, 74-75, 183 N.W. 260, 261 (1921). In Hanlyn
the owner contracted to sell land to Hanlyn, who gave notes for the purchase price. Id. at 74, 183
N.W. at 260. The contract was recorded. Id. The owner transferred one of the notes to the plaintiff
and subsequently deeded the land to a bank. Id. The bank obtained a quitclaim deed from Hanlyn.
The bank then sold the land to the defendant. Id. at 74, 183 N.W. at 260-61.
ii po
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conclusion that the best-considered ones indicate a trend
in favor of supporting titles to real property acquired in
good faith and in reliance upon a record, as against
equitable claims resulting from transactions not noted on
the title records. It would seem that sound policy would
require the giving of stability to titles acquired by persons
who, in good faith, rely upon the records. Stability would
certainly be impaired if protection is afforded to those
whose interests are of an equitable character and who
have not been sufficiently diligent to cause to be entered
upon the records the evidence thereof. 110
The combined decisions in Henniges and Rolette County Bank appeared to evidence an attitude of strict constructionism as the
prevalent doctrine that the North Dakota Supreme Court would
apply in later Recording Act cases. While "good faith" would continue to be a factor, the court would apply it in a pragmatic analysis
that would favor the record title and require a demonstration of
bad faith. The person holding the unrecorded instrument would
bear the onus of establishing active or affirmative bad faith on the
part of the adverse claimant. Heavy preference would be placed on
the record title, upholding claims supported by the record title
against a party claiming an interest on the basis of an unrecorded
instrument.
The extent to which this attitude was embraced by the
subsequent courts was demonstrated by the position enunciated in
Pierce Township v. Ernie.-"' "It is apparent from reading the
transcript that the [defendant] felt that he was entitled to rely on the
abstract of title and attorney's opinion and was not under
obligation to make inquiry. . . . He clearly did not understand his
full duty as a prospective purchaser of property.
"112 This
decision signaled the court's adoption of an open construction to be
applied in Recording Act cases. The court's analysis of the
circumstances
would be
subjective,
heavily favoring the
unrecorded equitable claim holder, notwithstanding his active
participation in the creation of the situation. In contrast to the
110. Id. at 77, 183 N.W. at 262.
111. 74 N.D. 16, 19N.W.2d 755 (1945).
112. Pierce Township v. Ernie, 74 N.D. 16, 28, 19 N.W.2d 755, 760 (1945). In Pierce Township
both the plaintiff and defendant claimed title to a gravel pit through deeds from the same grantor.
The plaintiffs deed predated the defendant's but was recorded after the defendant's deed was
recorded. Id. at 19, 19 N.W.2d at 756. The plaintiff had been hauling gravel out of the pit and the
defendant was aware that the plaintiffhad bought a pit in that area. Id. at 26, 19 N.W.2d at 759. The
court held that the plaintiff had a duty to inquire further and was not a good faith purchaser. Id. at
27, 19 N.W.2d at 760.
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relatively more stable situation when the court applied strict
construction, open construction invokes absolute subjectivity in
every case and the facts of each case become overwhelmingly
significant. The burden is on the party relying on the record to
prove a negative - that the facts do not negate his reliance on the
record.
Henceforward, aside from the sterile recital of the previously
enunciated principles, the only conclusion that one can draw from
the cases decided under the open construction philosophy is that an
intended purchaser cannot rely on the record title. In every case in
the nearly forty years since Pierce Township, the resolution of the
appeal has favored the holder of the interest not of record. 113 This
should not be construed as a damnation of the court, but this
philosophy does auger against a purchaser's reliance on the record
title. In many of these cases, the court's result would have been the
same under the strict construction philosophy; however, a few
decisions defy reconciliation with other principles recognized by the
court.
The criteria the court has used to measure good faith is
generally whether a prudent man would have made further
inquiry. 1 4 The "prudent man" is generally described as an
abstract person having ordinary regard for his personal affairs." 5
In Ciy of Bismarck v. Casey" 6 the court observed, "The testimony
further shows Mr. Casey is a man of wide experience, who has been
engaged in the real estate business in the city of Bismarck for many
years. He was, therefore, bound to know what an ordinarily
prudent man would have known or should have known from any
circumstances that would have put him on inquiry."" ' 7
Apparently, the court engrafted the background of Mr. Casey onto
113. See arth Builders, Inc. v. State, 325 N.W.2d 258 (1982) (lessee of sand and gravel rights
was nt
gooid aith purchaser without notice of prior lease); Burlington N., Inc. v. Hall, 322
N-W.21 233 (1982) (purchaser had constructive notice ofoutstanding contract for deed); Hunt Trust
'stti v. Kiker, 269 N.W.2d 377 (1978) (lessor had constructive notice of prior oil and gas lease).
'tulitam x. Dikinson, 142 N.W.2d 111 (1966) (subsequent purchaser had constructive nottce of
c

i clus).
tSl

114. (ress v. Evans, I Dakota 371, 383, 46 N.W. 1132, 1134 (1877).
15. Se Walker v. Buhl, 211 Mich. 124, 178 N.W. 651 (1920) (prudent mian uses "such car in
liciding as, in general, prudent men of intelligence and integrity in such miters ciiploy in their
," it afllirs"); H lden v. Missouri R. R. Co., 108 Mo.App. 665, 84 S.W. 133 (1904) (a reastnably
!
' il ul il will mitilli1.
ght what hican fortti st as protalet, now lssilt his txiclii
t] v uts
,l,: ui I't rclv l ssitlth. He will orler his precaution h l t
ttuistrt
ti what lpa ;
rs liaS
l ikel iII'
1
klit w i tttirs
of thing,'
) 84 '.V it 136 (qutting Ain. Brewritg Ass'n s. I 'alh i. 141 NI
71. 4275,
WV.68t2 (1807).
116. 77 N.D. 295, 43 N.W.2d 372 (1950).
117. City of Bismarck v. Casey, 77 N.D. 295,305, 43 N.W.2d 372, 379 (1950). Casey invlved a
ttdeniation of realty. Id. at 297, 43 N.W.2d at 374. Mr. Casey, the defendant, hadiheen It real
cslat, agent for his grantor prior to his purchase of the disputed realty. Id. at 304, 43 N.W.2d it 379.
'Ilit court held that Mr. Casey was bound to know from his own deed that ibter deeds froI'm. his
gratir showed the grantor's intention to grant an easement. Id.
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the character of the "ordinarily prudent man," thereby imposing a
higher standard or duty. This removes the criteria from the
abstract and injects further subjective determinants into the
deliberations.
Apparently, not only must the factual circumstances
surrounding the transactions be considered, but the background of
each party and perhaps even the relative position of contending
parties enter into the analysis. This obviously creates additional
problems, not only because it injects additional factors for the court
to consider, but also because of the inherent fallacy involved in
imposing different standards based upon occupational categories.
Being a realtor does not necessitate knowledge regarding title
matters - neither does being an attorney. A purdent man acts
prudently regardless of educational or professional background. To
ascribe greater or lesser prudence based upon these criteria could
turn quiet title actions into demonstrations of character or
professional ability, often with a party trying to establish a lack of
any special expertise or ability on his own part.
Two cases decided in 1953 graphically demonstrate how
ethereal decisions under open construction can be. Dixon v.
Kaufman'1 8 and Messersmith v. Smith'" 9 both involved deeds that had
not been acknowledged before a notary public although notarized,
but which had been recorded. In each case, the defendants were the
grantees from the grantees of the unacknowledged instrument. The
grantees had no knowledge of the defective acknowledgement. In
Dixon the plaintiffs were the grantors; 12 in Messersmith the plaintiff
was the nephew of the grantor who held a deed without recording it
2
for five years.' '
In Dixon the plaintiff conveyed realty covering both homestead
and nonhomestead property to the defendant. The plaintiff claimed
that the defendant's deed was procured by fraud.122 The court
observed:
A deed that is absolutely void passes no title. It gives
118. 79 N.D. 633, 58 N.W.2d 797 (1953).
119.60 NMW.2d 276 (N.D. 1953).
120. Dixon v. Kaufman, 79 N.D. 633, 640, 58 N.W.2d 797, 801 (1953). In Dixon Kaufman
acquired a mineral deed from the plaintiffs. Id. at 640, 58 N.W.2d at 801. Kaufman transferred the
deed to a bona fide purchaser. Id. at 641, 58 N.W.2d at 801. The plaintiffs claimed that the deed to
Kaufman was obtained by fraud. Id. at 641, 58 N.W.2d at 802.
121. Messersmith v. Smith, 60 N.W.2d 276, 277-78 (1953). In Messersmith Caroline
NlcssItrs ith convic\cd lt
inttcst in jintly owned propti't to thli plaintill. Id. at 277. Carolin.
subsequently conveyed the mineral rights to Smith. Id. Smith conveyed the interest to Seale, who
Ivccirdtd his intt'cist prior to the plaintifls recording ot'his intcrest. Id
Tlte eed toi Smitth. althotth
bearing a certificate of acknowledgement,was not in fact acknowledged. Id. at 280.
122, Dixon, 79 N.D. at 641-42, 58 N.W.2d at 802.

222

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 60:203

no constructive notice and a claim of bona fides may not
be based upon a void instrument, even when placed of
record in the manner prescribed by statute. . . . A deed
obtained by fraud is sometimes void but more often is
merely voidable, depending upon the facts on which the
claim of fraud is based.... It would seem, however, that
in such cases the innocent purchaser should be protected
unless the fraud is clear, unequivocal, and its force
undiminished by a lack of care on the part of a mentally
competent, defrauded grantor. If a loss results to parties
ignorant and innocent of the fraud, it must fall on those
whose lack of care and attention made the fraud possible
rather than upon those who were wholly unconnected
12
with the fraudulent transaction. 1
In Messersmith the court relied upon the application of statutes
to reach its conclusion. The court noted that the recording statutes
provided that the recording of an instrument in accordance with the
24
statutes imparted constructive notice to subsequent purchasers.1
The court also noted, "It may be stated as a general rule that the
recording of an instrument affecting the title to real estate which
does not meet the statutory requirements of the recording laws
affords no constructive notice."1 25 The court concluded:
In the absence of the fact of acknowledgment the deed was
not entitled to be recorded, regardless of the recital in the
certificate. The deed not being entitled to be recorded,
the record thereof did not constitute notice of its
execution, Section 47-1945, or contents, Section 47-1919.
The record appearing in the office of the register of deeds
not being notice of the execution or contents of the
mineral deed, the purchaser from the grantee therein did
not become a "subsequent purchaser in good faith, and
for a valuable consideration" within the meaning of
Section 47-1941, N.D.R.C. 1943.126
123. Id. at 646-47, 58 N.W.2d at 805 (citation omitted).
124. Messersmith, 60 N.W.2d at 280. The court quoted 5 47-1945 of the Revised Code of 1943,
which provided: The deposit and recording of an instrument proved and certified according to the
provisions of this chapter are constructive notice of the execution ofsuch instrument to all purchasers
and encumbrancers subsequent to the recording. N.D. REV. CODE § 47-1945 (1943) (currently
codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19-45 (1978)).
125.60 N.W.2d at 280.
126. Id. at 281 (citing N.D. REv. CODE 5 47-1945, -1919, -1941 (1943) (currently at N.D.
CENT. CODE §§47-19-45, -19, -41 (1978)).
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The Recording Act provides that every conveyance of real
estate not recorded shall be void as against any subsequent
purchaser whose conveyance is first recorded. 127 Messersmith's
deed was unrecorded and the court recited no circumstances that
should have put the defendant on notice of the unrecorded deed.
The grantor had deeded one-half of the minerals to the defendant's
predecessor. 128 The court stated, "For the loss which resulted from
her [the grantor] acts, the plaintiff in this case is not to blame. His
failure to record his deed will not defeat the title which he holds
unless there appears against it a record title consisting of
instruments executed and recorded in the manner prescribed by
29
our recording statutes." 1
Not surprisingly, the defendant petitioned for a rehearing,
which was denied by the court, explaining the distinction between
Messersmith and Dixon as follows:
We are here dealing with a prior unrecorded valid and
effective conveyance that is challenged by a subsequent
purchaser to whom no title was conveyed and who claims
that the recording laws vest title in him by virtue of a deed
that was not acknowledged in fact and therefore not
entitled to be placed of record. This situation differs
materially from a case where an attack is made by a
subsequent purchaser on a prior recorded deed which
actually conveyed title to the grantee but was not entitled
30
to be recorded because of a latent defect. 1
The court demonstrated the continued viability of the open
construction philosophy in Earth Builders, Inc. v. State, 13 1 an opinion
sharply criticized by Judge Garaas in his dissenting opinion. Judge
Garaas illustrated the highly subjective determination involved in
the application of open construction. 132 Absent from either opinion,
however, is any consideration of a change effected subsequent to
127. N. D. CENT. CODE S 47-19-41 (1978).
128. Messersmith, 60 N.W.2d at 277.
129. Id. at 282.
130. Id.
131. 325 N.W.2d 258 (N.D. 1982). In Earth Builders the plaintiff had a lease to gravel, rock,
sand, and clay on a tract of land. The plaintiff acquired the lease in 1976 but did not record until
1981. In 1980 the owner of the tract issued a "material option" to the defendant covering the same
land. The defendant recorded in 1980. Earth Builders, Inc. v. State, 325 N.W.2d 258 (N.D. 1982).
132. Id. at 260 (Garaas. District.judge. sitting by designation, dissenting). The dissent stated:
The malority opinion works an injustice to innocent purchasers for value by requiring
them to defend their position against a previous lessee who refused to record its lease .
...An intending purchaser should not have to travel throughout the community and
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Pierce Township that should have restricted, if not eliminated, open
construction. At the time of Pierce Township, trial de novo was
available on appeal, which enabled the supreme court to place its
own interpretation on the facts. Trial de novo is no longer
available 13 3 with the trial court's findings of fact being accepted
unless found clearly erroneous. 134 Because of the highly subjective
nature of open construction, it is dependent on factual
determinations to resolve the issues. The result is that the court
must often do as the dissent in Earth Builders observed: "The
majority opinion has recited only such facts as to support its ruling
and has failed to recite the totality of facts which clearly support the
trial court's ruling. ',135
IV. CONCLUSION
Open construction effectively emasculates the Recording Act.
There can be little question that the object and purpose of
recording acts is to encourage people to record instruments
conveying interests in real estate and to visit upon the
nonrecorders the consequences of their failure to avail themselves
of the means of protecting their interest. Certainly, the court must
recognize exceptions to avoid situations in which a pure record title
theory would cause a harsh result, particularly when the claimant
totally ignores obvious circumstances or is apparently trying to take
advantage of a situation. As the court in Rolette County Bank
observed, "It would seem that sound policy would require the
giving of stability to titles acquired by persons who, in good faith,
rely upon the public records.' 3 6 Good faith consists of an honest
intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of
another together with an absence of all information or belief of facts
inquire of all the neighbors as to possible interests of' third persons. The majority
opinion will place such burden on all future purchasers in North Dakota.
Id. at 261.
133. Tl'rtingetn %vMongeon 200 N. W .2d 50 (N.D. 1972). As ol July I, 1971 the effective date of'
wpcil d
28-37-32 o f h North Dakota Centurv Code, trial de nova is no hinger available. Id. at
51. SeeAct of March 18, 1971, ch. 311, § 2, 1971 N.D. Sess. Laws 311.
134. Jahner v. Jacob, 233 N.W.2d 791 (N.D. 1975) (facts as found by the trial court will be
upheld on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous).
135. Earth Builders, 325 N.W.2d at 260 (Garaas, District Judge, sitting by designation,
dissenting). Subsequent to the preparation of this text, the court decided Nygaard v. Robinson, 341
N.W.2d 349 (1983). In Nygaard the court observed, "Although a broad interpretation of Earth
Builders would suggest that this court used a de novo standard of review when examining the issue of
a bona fide purchase for value without notice, we emphasize that the issue presented mixed questions
of fact and law." 341 N.W.2d at 353.
136. Rolette County Bank v. Hanlyn, 48 N.D. 72, 77, 183 N.W. 260, 262 (1921).

19841

UNRELIABLE RECORD TITLE

225

public may rely upon the record title. The legislature has revised
the statutes to reverse judicial decisions that have encroached upon
this policy. The courts must begin to acknowledge this policy.
Persons buying real estate should be entitled to rely on the record
title and their good faith in doing so should be presumed. The court
should still charge the purchaser with knowledge obtained through
inquiry stimulated by factors appearing on the record or by
extraneous facts that would render the transaction unconscientious.
The court in Trumbo v. Vernon1 37 observed:
We think the following a correct statement of the law.
Where the court is satisfied that the subsequent purchaser
acted in bad faith, and that he either had actual notice or
might have had that notice had he not willfully or
negligently shut his eyes against those lights, which, with
proper observation, would have led him to knowledge, he
must suffer the consequences of his ignorance and be held
to have had notice.... ,138
This position is even more justifiable today than at the time
the court decided Trumbo. In this day and age, the person who
willfully withholds from the records evidence of his interest in real
estate should be the one who bears the burden of justifying his
claim against the mandate of the Recording Act. The person who
that would render the transaction unconscientious.
The legislature has established the public policy to be that the
intentionally or negligently withholds from the public records
evidence of an interest in real property should bear a heavy burden
in avoiding the clear consequences the Recording Act imposes
upon him.

137.22 N.D. 191, 133 N.W.296 (1911).
138. 'rumbo %-.Vernon. 22 N.I). 191, 195. 133 N.W. 296.298 (1911) (quoling l)oyl V Tas.
4111. (45 cam.) 202.25( (1843).

